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The need for a system view to regulate artificial intelligence/
machine learning-based software as medical device
Sara Gerke 1, Boris Babic2, Theodoros Evgeniou3 and I. Glenn Cohen4✉
Artificial intelligence (AI) and Machine learning (ML) systems in medicine are poised to significantly improve health care, for
example, by offering earlier diagnoses of diseases or recommending optimally individualized treatment plans. However, the
emergence of AI/ML in medicine also creates challenges, which regulators must pay attention to. Which medical AI/ML-based
products should be reviewed by regulators? What evidence should be required to permit marketing for AI/ML-based software as a
medical device (SaMD)? How can we ensure the safety and effectiveness of AI/ML-based SaMD that may change over time as they
are applied to new data? The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, has recently proposed a discussion paper to
address some of these issues. But it misses an important point: we argue that regulators like the FDA need to widen their scope
from evaluating medical AI/ML-based products to assessing systems. This shift in perspective—from a product view to a system
view—is central to maximizing the safety and efficacy of AI/ML in health care, but it also poses significant challenges for agencies
like the FDA who are used to regulating products, not systems. We offer several suggestions for regulators to make this challenging
but important transition.
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI), particularly its subset Machine learning
(ML), has the potential to improve health care systems worldwide,
for example, by optimizing workflows in hospitals, providing more
accurate diagnoses, and bringing better medical treatments to
patients. However, medical AI/ML also creates new challenges that
we, as a society, and especially current regulators like the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), need to face: Which medical
AI/ML-based products should undergo review by regulators? What
evidence should regulators require makers of AI/ML-based soft-
ware as a medical device (SaMD) to submit as a prerequisite to
permit marketing? How to ensure the improvement of AI/ML-
based SaMD’s performance in real-time while safeguarding their
safety and effectiveness?
Some AI/ML-based SaMD have already received marketing
authorization in the U.S., including IDx-DR in 2018, the first AI/ML
diagnostic that provides a screening decision for the eye disease
diabetic retinopathy, which its maker claims is the “first ever
autonomous AI system cleared by the FDA to provide a diagnostic
decision1,2”. Many patients and physicians are particularly
concerned about such “autonomous” devices. The current AI/
ML-based SaMD that received marketing authorization by the FDA
have what the FDA has called “locked” algorithms—they do not
evolve over time and do not use new data to alter their
performance3. If the algorithm changes through usage, such
SaMD will, at present, likely require another FDA round of review3.
Thus, AI/ML makers will probably be inclined not to update their
SaMD—both to reduce the cost and effort, but also because there
are risks to proposing an update (and thus signaling a deficiency
of the baseline product) if FDA does not approve the update or
there is a significant delay4. For these reasons, the most valuable
asset of AI/ML, its ability to improve by learning from data, may
not be fully harnessed.
Elsewhere we have discussed the FDA’s recent attempt to
wrestle with what we call “the update problem”, its treatment of
“locked” versus “adaptive” algorithms, and have made proposals
for how the FDA’s approach might be improved, such as through
continuous monitoring processes that consider specific risks of AI/
ML systems4. In this article, we make a more fundamental point:
The FDA and its sister regulators in other countries have primarily
been product regulators—they review and ultimately approve or
reject medical products such as drugs and devices. AI/ML-based
SaMD and perhaps other future ways in which AI/ML will be
incorporated in medical products will require the agency and its
sister regulators to shift more towards a “system” view. Even IDx-
DR, the most “autonomous” AI/ML-based product authorized for
marketing by the FDA, is not an island. It is one part of a larger
system involving various kinds of human involvement—from
health care teams inputting the data to physicians reacting to the
AI recommendation to insurers deciding whether to reimburse
only for certain courses of action. It is the entire system that must
be evaluated—a concept that we call the “system approach”. We
discuss how an agency like the FDA should think about AI/ML in a
systemic way and how this puts pressure, for example, on
traditional concepts of the limits of the FDA’s jurisdiction—in
particular, the current approach that the FDA does not regulate
the practice of medicine5. While a full-scale move into the system
approach is currently infeasible for regulators, we discuss how
they might take further steps in this direction, which can improve
the public’s confidence in the use of AI in health care.
WHAT ARE AI/ML-BASED SAMD
Several medical AI/ML-based products must undergo review by
regulators. For example, in the U.S., a medical device is defined in
Section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and is
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“an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is (…)
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease (…),
which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man (…), and which is
not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes”.
Under U.S. law, some AI/ML-based software functions may not
fall under the device definition (e.g., certain clinical decision
support software under Section 520(o)(1)(E) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act), but some do. In particular, the term
“Software as a Medical Device” (SaMD) is used to refer to software
that is on its own a medical device, “without being part of a
hardware medical device”6,7. While not everyone is supportive of
the SaMD construct, given that the FDA has committed to it, in
what follows we examine how it can be enriched by going beyond
a pure product worldview.
WHY THE PRODUCT WORLDVIEW IS INADEQUATE FOR AI/ML-
BASED SAMD
AI/ML-based SaMD raise new challenges for regulators. As
compared to typical drugs and medical devices, we argue that
due to their systemic aspects, AI/ML-based SaMD will present
more variance between performance in the artificial testing
environment and in actual practice settings, and thus potentially
more risks and less certainty over their benefits. Variance can
increase due to human factors or the complexity of these systems
and how they interact with their environment. Unlike drugs, the
usage of software and generally Information Technologies (IT) is
known to be highly affected by organizational factors such as
resources, staffing, skills, training, culture, workflow, and processes
(e.g., regarding data quality management)8. There is no reason to
expect that the adoption and impact of AI/ML-based SaMD will be
consistent, or even improve performance, across all settings. A
good cautionary tale comes from the use of computer-aided
detection (CAD) for mammography, which was, in particular,
financially encouraged by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services in the early 2000s as a way to improve breast cancer
detection. As a study in JAMA Internal Medicine showed, because
of the way physicians interacted with CAD they performed no
better (and in some ways worse) when CAD was introduced9.
Human judgment also introduces well-known biases into an AI/ML
environment, including, for example, inability to reason with
probabilities provided by AI/ML systems, over extrapolation from
small samples, identification of false patterns from noise, and
undue risk aversion10. Even with a single user in a single setting,
there may be poor consistency: over time—both in terms of
experience but even in the course of the day—we may see more
risk aversion or alert fatigue of physicians. Judges, for example,
have been documented to have a different tolerance for risk
during the course of a single day11. These make it much more
difficult for regulators to decide whether permitting marketing
authorization is warranted, but also, for example, for a purchaser
of an AI/ML system to determine whether it will add value to that
individual practice or hospital. Regulators like the FDA have
already started considering some of these issues, such as requiring
training programs and human factors validation testing12.
However, there are more nuanced and possibly complex systemic
issues to consider.
AI/ML-based SaMD also differ from other medical technologies,
such as the da Vinci surgical system13, because (1) they have the
capacity to continuously learn, (2) they have the potential to
become ubiquitous in medical interactions and make recommen-
dations (unlike robotic-assisted surgical systems), and (3) the way
they reach their recommendations is often opaque to physicians.
For example, the latter factor creates particular puzzles for
regulators: Do different physicians interact differently with the
same algorithm if they believe the basis for its decision-making is
explainable (even if they do not themselves understand the basis
for that decision) as opposed to when they believe the algorithm
is more opaque?
Variance will likely further increase as future AI/ML-based SaMD
begin to interact with physicians dynamically, for example, by
responding to the physician’s manipulations and possibly also
becoming better attuned to the preferences of each individual
user. The more human-AI interactions in decision-making, the
more uncertainty as to what outcomes the AI/ML-based SaMD
(and similar medical devices) will actually produce in clinical
settings due to factors outlined above. Thus, even attempts to
engage in human factors testing will have difficulties determining
outcomes if evaluation is not done in actual practice settings since
outcomes are likely to vary much more than, say, the use of a drug
on a particular type of patient.
These insights are well captured by the so-called Kasparov’s
Law, named for the chess player Garry Kasparov: the idea that a
weak human cooperating with a machine under a good process is
superior to a strong computer alone and, surprisingly, to a strong
human with a machine under a weak process14. “Strong” and
“weak” refer to the skill or lack thereof of the human, but the key
focal point is the “process”. Kasparov made this observation
during a 2005 chess tournament in which the winners were,
counterintuitively, two amateur chess players who used three
computers and who were able to better manipulate and coach
their computers to take an in-depth look into positions than chess
Grandmasters and participants with greater computational
power14. Kasparov’s observation can also be seen in other
situations in daily life. For example, most people use Google as
a search platform, but some are quicker (and more efficient) in
identifying the information needed by entering the “right” key
words into the engine. The key insight here is that we cannot
know whether the AI/ML-based SaMD will improve outcomes
without knowing more about the process.
To see this in the context of health care, consider an example
the FDA gives in a recent discussion paper: The FDA considers an
AI/ML-based SaMD that “receives electrocardiogram, blood
pressure, and pulse-oximetry signals from a primary patient
monitor” and then “signals are processed and analyzed to detect
patterns that occur at the onset of physiologic instability”, with an
alert for the physician warning “that prompt clinical action is
needed to prevent potential harm to the patient”3. Imagine the
FDA permitted marketing of such an AI/ML-based SaMD. The FDA
then asks what should happen if the company retrained its
algorithm using additional data and “the revised algorithm has the
same sensitivity and false-alarm rate as the previous version”, but
it can now alert “15minutes prior to the onset of physiologic
instability, which the previous version of the algorithm could not
do”3?
This seems like a great advantage, but without robust human
factors testing, we cannot know if the new version is actually
better. It is possible that the way humans react to these alerts
going off further away in time from the signs of instability makes
the algorithm less effective; for example, because the alert and the
instability are no longer paired so closely in time, the users begin
to doubt the probative value of the alerts and begin discounting
them more often.
In addition to the uncertainty introduced by human users’
reactions to AI/ML output, the system view reveals additional
complex and interacting elements to consider—interactions
between different parts of the care team with the AI, the payment
structure, possibly data providers, software components providers,
and trainers. For example, an AI/ML-based SaMD might be
approved by regulators on the understanding that a physician
can always overrule its recommendations. But what happens if
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that, while formally true, is nonetheless in practice a fairly rare
occurrence because a payer will only reimburse for that which is
recommended by the AI/ML system? Should that be considered as
part of the regulatory approval process?
The key insight that the health care impact of AI/ML-based
SaMD depends on many factors of a broader system indicates that
the regulators’ focus should be on designing an appropriate
process for managing this new environment taking a more system
approach than a product one. Unless regulatory review is attuned
to such system aspects as outlined above, it will be woefully
incomplete. The insight also helps us see that, perhaps
paradoxically, more autonomous AI/ML systems can create more,
rather than less, predictability in the emerging human-AI
environment.
WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO FULLY ADOPT A SYSTEM
APPROACH
Clearly, taking the system perspective seriously makes the job of
regulators like the FDA evaluating AI/ML-based SaMD much more
difficult. A full system approach would require the regulator to
collect data on a myriad of information beyond its current
regulatory gaze and perhaps even beyond its legal mandate,
requiring additional statutory authority3—the reimbursement
decisions of insurers, the effects of court decisions on liability,
any behavioral biases in the process, data quality of any third-
party providers, any (possibly proprietary) machine learning
algorithms developed by third parties, and many others. In a full
system approach, the regulator would then issue a limited
regulatory authorization that tracks factors like the ones discussed
above. Indeed, the regulator might even require approval to come
at the level of a specific hospital, possibly with specific trained and
authorized users, including, among other things, detailed hospital-
level information about how the AI/ML-based SaMD is integrated
into the workflow and staffing levels of that hospital, how the
practice style and training of the physicians at that hospital
interact with it, how the payers in that market authorize or do not
authorize reimbursement for actions that deviate from its
recommendations, and how the tort law in that jurisdiction
intersects with provider decision-making.
This would be a huge change from what the FDA and its peer
regulators in other countries currently consider as part of their
review. One could, perhaps, find some loose analogies in the way
the United Kingdom’s specialized Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) licenses individual clinics for
particular reproductive technology uses such as maternal spindle
transfer (MST) or pronuclear transfer (PNT), two mitochondrial
replacement techniques to prevent the transmission of serious
mitochondrial disease from a mother to her infant15. To act
lawfully, clinics need to get a license from the HFEA to carry out
one or both of these techniques—they need to show the
capability to perform MST and/or PNT15. In addition, they also
must receive another approval from the HFEA when using one of
these techniques for a particular patient15. Something similar
could, in theory, be done for AI/ML-based SaMD, but the burden
on the regulator would be much more demanding since in
making such local evaluations it must consider far more facets of
health care delivery, insurance, and law, and do so for a much
wider set of technologies. Such an approach would also raise
difficult questions about how to far upstream regulators would
need to go, for example, in validating “golden datasets” as ground
truth comparators.
Moreover, because the system itself may change, even if the AI/
ML remains “locked”, a full system approach would not treat
premarket approval even at the level of a hospital as a “one and
done”, but instead tentative and subject to reevaluation. To be
sure, the FDA currently monitors the safety of medical products
through its Sentinel program, and in September 2019, the FDA
announced its goal to enlarge Sentinel to three distinct
coordinating centers with more monitoring capabilities16,17. But
a full system approach would require far more than this. Finally, a
full system approach would require the FDA at least to take some
steps in contravention of one of its shibboleths: that the FDA does
not regulate the practice of medicine5. Such multi-faceted
changes in the processes and possibly mandates of the regulators
may be necessary in the world of increasingly sophisticated AI/ML
systems, but a full change may not be possible or even desirable
as it may limit innovation or negatively affect the behavior of
stakeholders.
TRANSITIONING FROM A PRODUCT TO A SYSTEM APPROACH:
FIRST STEPS
We believe that a full system approval and monitoring approach is
out of reach for today’s regulators, especially because of expertise,
resources, political obstacles, and the difficulties in controlling
human behavior18. The Perfect, however, must not be the enemy
of the Good. If regulators cannot realistically take the full system
approach, they can at least somewhat widen their perspective.
Doing so is also in harmony with the FDA’s increasing emphasis in
its AI/ML-based SaMD publications of implementing more “real-
world performance monitoring”3,19.
Regulators like the FDA can, for example, demand fuller human
factors analysis of how actual physicians and others of the health
care team such as nurses react to outputs of particular AIs and
require training for users to help minimize variance. As it stands,
the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine and thus does
not oversee the training of medical professionals. However, even
with those restrictions in place, it can require the AI maker to set
up a training program for their product, such as in the case of IDx-
DR where the FDA required a training program including
instructions on how to acquire and process quality images12.
Regulators could require more, such as ongoing system monitor-
ing, periodic retraining, software and usage inspections, review of
aggregate usage statistics (e.g., to identify possible drifts in
treatment frequencies and decision styles of users)4. They could
also demand data and model validation and robustness analysis
(e.g., via multiple re-trainings with different data subsets and data
perturbations) of the AI/ML, such as due to data quality or
adversarial attack issues4. Further, regulators could also require
testing variants that provide humans with different degrees of
freedom: For example, users’ discretion can be more or less
limited in cases where devices provide probabilistic recommenda-
tions such as IDx-DR; or the AI/ML-based SaMD may provide more
or fewer alternative recommended courses of action or even
usage parameter choices. Regulators may also simply require
clinical trials of the AI/ML-based SaMD as used in actual planned
clinical settings. Moreover, regulators could also request data
collected outside traditional clinical trials such as from Fitbits and
other wearables capturing users’ behavioral changes over time as
well as electronic health records capturing all decisions that may
be related to the use of an AI/ML-based SaMD20.
In a sense, it may be useful to reframe what the hospitals and
practices are doing: they are not merely buying an AI/ML-based
tool, but hiring one. Cognitive testing of a physician will not tell
you how they will do when added to a preexisting team in a
particular health system, and employees need to be continuously
assessed. The same is true for AI/ML-based SaMD.
THE SYSTEM APPROACH AND THE SPECIAL CASE OF
“LOCKED” VERSUS “ADAPTIVE” ALGORITHMS
All AI/ML-based SaMD that the FDA has thus far reviewed have
been cleared or approved as “locked” algorithms, which it defines
as “an algorithm that provides the same result each time the same
input is applied to it and does not change with use”3. The agency
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is currently developing a strategy for how to regulate “unlocked”
or “adaptive” AI/ML algorithms—algorithms that may change as
they are applied to new data3.
This is a welcome development. Much of the value of medical
AI/ML-based SaMD is in their ability to update as new and
hopefully more representative data, for example, becomes
available. Unfortunately, the task of reviewing such an “update”
is much more difficult when we consider the system rather than
the product perspective.
Elsewhere we have suggested that regulators should prioritize
risk monitoring to address the “update problem”4. We articulated
some key features that risk monitoring should focus on (i.e.,
concept drift, covariate shift, and instability) and suggested some
ways to implement it4. Our goal is to emphasize that the tasks
adopted by a true system view for regulating adaptive AI/ML-
based SaMD are indeed even more demanding since they consider
many more facets of the delivery of care. If there were no human
involvement, for a hypothetically truly fully autonomous AI (despite
the company’s marketing, the first AI/ML diagnostic IDx-DR is not),
the update could be approved based on retesting a reference set
of patients, all prior patients, or even on simulated patient data. But
when humans are involved, the system perspective requires
considering how the update interacts with human usage and
organizational factors. To be sure, in some instances, AI/ML-based
SaMD updates will have no effect or improve things from a human
factor perspective. The point is that determining the effects of the
update is much more challenging for a regulator when there is
significant human involvement in decision-making.
CONCLUSION
AI/ML-based SaMD pose new safety challenges for regulators. They
need to make a difficult choice: either largely ignore systemic and
human factor issues with each approval and subsequent update or
require the maker to conduct significant organizational and human
factors validation testing with each update resulting in increased
cost and time, which may, in turn, chill the desire of the maker to
engage in potentially very beneficial innovations or possible updates.
Striking the right balance is a challenge that may take time to
resolve. However, ignoring all systemic aspects of AI/ML-based
SaMD, such as those we outlined, may not be an option.
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